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required of the premises is that they be better known or more manifest than the conclusion. But, oddly enough, Aristotle and his medieval com mentators describe demonstrational causality in the same terms as efficient causality. Aristotle speaks of the conclusion as an "effect" of the premises; his commentators speak of the "sufficiency" of first principles or axioms (dignitates) in producing the conclusion.
This concept of causality has seldom been studied,3 and little is known about the medieval Posterior Analytics commentaries in which it is most fully explicated. The aim of this article is correspondingly modest and introductory. We will first briefly describe the place of Posterior Analytics commentaries in the recovery of Aristotle and the development of medieval logic and natural philosophy. In the second place, we will introduce the work presented in this article, Richard Rufiis of Cornwall's newly discovered commentary. In the third place, after distinguishing metaphysical (explanatory), epistemological (evidentiary), and logical prising the Topics, Sophistical Refutations, and the Prior and Posterior
Analytics, probably appeared first, closely followed by the Metaphysics and the works on natural philosophy. The first commentaries on the Topics* the Sophistical Refutations,9 and the Prior Analytics10 appeared at the close of the 12th century. Commentaries on the Posterior Analytics, the Metaphysics, the Physics, and other works of natural philosophy appeared in the early 13th century. Grosseteste's is a unique case, since he is both one of the last great
Aristotle translators and one of the first important commentators. Indeed, it seems likely that when Rufus refers to "the Commentator" on the Posterior Analytics, he means Grosseteste.13 Grosseteste's commentary was written in England. Not long afterwards Richard Rufus commented on the text at Paris as a master of arts, followed by Robert Kilwardby, whose commentary exists only in manuscript. None of these commen taries is well known, but Grossesteste's has received most attention.14 Since it also has less to say about the subject that concerns us, we have concentrated instead on Rufus' newly discovered commentary, printing the section from which we most often quote (Appendix 2). But form and matter are ultimate intrinsic causes: basic elements. So if we are going to construct an argument against regress in causality in such a case, it will have to be different in some way from the arguments we encounter for extrinsic causes.36 It might be that we should not even look for essentially ordered causes among the causes of being. Perhaps Rufus is considering here only the causes of becoming?that is, efficient and final causes. After all, what is said of matter and form is not that they are first causes, but that they are ultimate causes or explanations for the structure of reality.
Demonstrational Cause (first principle)
If 'causality' seems to refer only to a capacity of things or parts of things, demonstrational causes, by contrast, must be propositions, and they must be propositions or premises which meet certain conditions.
Aristotle specifies that premises must be first, immediate, and true; they must be prior and better known; and they must cause the conclusion (71b20-22). That last condition in one sense defines demonstrational causality: it is the relation of premise to conclusion. In another sense, the other conditions are at least as informative.
But before considering the conditions which must be met by demon strational causes, let us look first at how cause and demonstration came to be associated for Rufus as an Aristotelian.
It is a consequence of
Aristotle's twofold definition of science. Science is both the knowledge of the causes of things37 (and how they cannot be otherwise) and the product of demonstration.38 Since 'science' is not an equivocal term, the two def initions must somehow amount to the same thing. Taking up the hint which Aristotle provides in his last condition, medievals understood the relation of premises and conclusion in a demonstration as one of cause and effect.
The only reservation Rufus displays about the identification of the knowledge of cause and the product of demonstration is to draw a few dis tinctions. One Aristotelian definition refers to demonstration as a process (demonstration); the other to the premises themselves, which are described as the causes of the conclusion. Rufus describes this distinction as between the 'roots' of science and its 'act':
We should say that to know scientifically is a certain effect and it is caused by demonstration, and consequently it has to be defined by demon stration. But this is twofold: It is either according as demonstration is considered in its root, and then it is nothing other than the medium itself or cause ... Or it is according as demonstration is considered in act (Appendix 2 Series 1 ad 1).
To understand why there was so little resistance to this approach, we need to look at the six Aristotelian conditions as a group. In one respect at least Rufus is in agreement with Jonathan Barnes and modern interpreters of the Posterior Analytics:39 The last three conditions stipulate the relation of a premise to a determinate conclusion?a premise must be better known, prior to, and a cause of the conclusion; the first three do not.
But since the premises of [a demonstration] are a necessary and inde fectable cause, it follows that they are better known and prior. For those conditions, as was said, inhere in the premise on the basis of the comparison according to a determinate conclusion (Appendix 2 Series 2 ad 2).
But though the premise is better known, absolutely speaking, it is not better known to us. The premises must be better known when considered in the context of all the other propositions belonging to a given order, but not in regard to our understanding.
Premises can be compared in two ways, however: namely either to all propositions of that order, or to a determinate conclusion. This condition is 'prior' in the first mode [of comparison],... but it is posterior in so far as a premise and its conclusion are compared to us (Appendix 2 Series 2 ad 1).
Elsewhere Rufus tells us that premises must be prior, in being, to the conclusion (Appendix 2 Series 2 solutio instantiae Thus, when Rufus says that the premises must be complete in their genus, he means that it is sufficient for the premises to provide an adequate basis for a conclusion which specifies something about the form or purpose of a thing. We do not also require that there be a complete set of premises related to its efficient or material cause.
Let us now look at the remaining conditions Rufus and Aristotle require of premises. They must be 'true', which Rufus describes as a relation between words and their significates. They must be 'immediate'
and 'first'. That means they must be the most basic possible explanation.
Finally, premises must be 'better known' and 'prior' in the order of being to the conclusion, by which Rufus means they must explain more about reality; they must?in other words?be very general. Here Rufus is concerned with intelligibility per se, a concept of explanatory power.
Thus it is clear that demonstrational cause is a variety of metaphysi cal cause, concerned with explanation. But since that explanation has to take the form of a valid demonstration, it must be a hybrid of metaphysi cal and logical cause. Of the six conditions, the first three might be taken as validity conditions; inference must be based ultimately on true, imme diately evident, and primitive axioms. But what is immediately grasped includes 'reasons' (rationes), the term medievale used to refer to the formulas which correctly describe the essences of things as they are. Here nothing mysterious is intended, but quite ordinary definitions such as 'a triangle is a three-sided figure', 'a human is a rational animal'?where moderns might think of definitions such as 'water is composed of two parts hydrogen and one part oxygen'. The stipulation that science not only must include such definitions, but also must proceed from the more general to the less general, from causes to effects, and from the more basic to the less basic, shows that this is also a metaphysical concept of cause.
Finally, we must consider why the language we associate with efficient causality is so often associated with demonstrational cause. As the reader will recall, when we discussed logical truth we noted that Rufus spoke of an element of truth moving the intellect. When discussing epis temologica! truth, we noted that Rufus speaks of necessary and sufficient propositions when describing premises from which a conclusion could le gitimately be inferred. And finally, though Rufus seems to use the term 'causality' only when refering to things, he has a comparable expression for propositions, 'virtus'. Discussing enthymeme and induction, he says that they have the same 'inferential power' (virtus inferendi).41 Elsewhere Rufus speaks of argumentive (virtus arguendi) power (Appendix 2 Series 4q.2).
A puzzling passage, which may help us toward a solution, reads as follows:
If one were to say 'first', since it is a premise in another demonstration, it is not [first] as far as its particular matter is concerned, but in so far as it has in itself the power of a posterior proposition, just as fire is not the first cause of combustion in its particular nature, but in so far as it has the force of superior causes. Therefore being first is appropriate to the premise of a demonstration not always through its own particular virtue, but rather by being prior... compared to a determinate conclusion ... (Appendix 2 Series 2 solutio instantiae).
This passage is part of a reply to the question, why after having specified that a premise must be "first", Aristotle adds that it must also be "prior". It presents a number of difficulties we will not be able to address here. But at least one thing is clear from it: Rufus sees the relation of propositions in exactly the same terms in which he sees the relation of es sentially ordered causes which are things. The relation of premises to each other and to the conclusion is like the relation of fire to prior causes of combustion. The conclusion has the force of an explanation of the world because its premises are basic and manifest.
Conclusion
What are we to make of demonstrational cause? It is an unfamiliar and perhaps an unattractive concept for twentieth-century philosophers. It is not, however, a concept which is unique or particularly characteristic of Richard Rufus. It can be seen in the works of Thomas Aquinas, for example.42 So if we are to understand the world of medieval philosophy, whose study is often rewarding precisely because of the extent to which it challenges our assumptions, we must begin to try to understand this usage. In this article our aims were modest and introductory, and as the reader will have noticed in our exposition of Rufus and will see in the text presented as an Appendix, there are still many more puzzles to consider. need not exist individuals belonging to each most specific species, but such species will always be divided by individuals habitually according to 
When lecturing on theology at a later date, Rufus employed the dis tinction between habitual and actual existence to argue that in the three days before the resurrection, Christ as man was buried in his tomb. In An. post. f. 29vb: Ad aliud dicendum quod, cum intellectus sit sicut tabula nuda, et omni careat cognitione, est simplex respectu cuiuscumque cognitionis in potentia. Sed intelligendum quod potentia duplex est, essen tialis et accidentalis. Intelligendum ergo quod illud quod primo modo est in potentia proprie dicitur fieri, cum exit in actum. Quod autem secundo modo est in potentia, non proprie dicitur fieri tale, sed essentiale. Est enim tale ubi sit prohibitum, et est dicere quod essentialiter tale est, licet accidentaliter sit non tale, sicut lapis est deorsum essentialiter, licet accidentaliter sit sursum.
This passage with its talk of accidental potential as something not in potential properly speaking is interesting for what it tells us about the de velopment of the terminology. But when Rufiis tells us that accidental potential differs from essential potential because what is in accidental potential is essentially the thing which will be actualized, it is just plain confusing. Fortunately, the distinction is better explained in the Physics commentary.
In Phys. I prooem. f. Ira: Dico: cum primo dicitur 'ergo ei nihil fit notum\ dicendum quod intellectus infusus est corpori sine omni cognitione et est in potentia respectu eius, sed hoc dupliciter. Respectu namque cogni tionis principiorum est in potentia accidentali, respectu cognitionis conclusionum est in potentia essentiali. Et est potentia accidentalis ilia quae non indiget nisi tantum removente prohibens ad hoc quod exeat in actum, ut lapis retentus sursum est in potentia deorsum. Potentia vero essentialis est quae indigit agente et transmutante et disponente ad hoc quod exeat in actum, sicut materia aeris est in potentia ignis. By themselves none of these points would suffice for the attribution; taken together they make it altogether unlikely that it is mistaken. Let us review them here. The three commentaries come from the same manu script, belong to the same genre, and were written in the same style. They express shared views, and they borrow from one another?this in an author who not only did not quote without acknowledgement, but sometimes referred to his own work in the third person (or spoke of a treatise he happened to have in his hand?"ecce in manu") rather than take credit for the work himself.
As to time and place, once the attribution is settled, they are reason ably easy to establish. [Series tertia] 1. Quaeritur quare magis notificat primum et immediatum quam aliquam aliarum condicionum.
2. Quaeritur etiam propter quid 'primum' habeat talem definitionem.
3. Et iterum minime videtur 'princ?pium' cadere in ratione 'primi';63
'primum' enim causalitatem non dicit, sed solum ordinem; 'princ?pium' autem utrumque. Magis ergo 'primum' habet cadere in eius definitione secundum quod dicitur 'princ?pium est prima causa' quam e converso. Et propterea non possunt praemissae sciri infinitae. 36. In the case of matter, the most basic is prime matter, which is completely unspeci fied or pure potential. Perhaps we can envision a regress in material causes, which would start when we ask "what is a house made of?" and continue when we ask "what is wood made of?", and would end only when the answer we receive is "prime matter".
At least the direction of dependence in a series of essentially ordered material causes seems clear. But that is not so clear in the case of formal causes. Would we be looking for a form so determinate, that it could not be further specified? That is, should we move downward on a Porphyrian tree from generic forms through ever more specific forms? Or would we move from the form of man to the form of animal and so on until we came to 'being' or some utterly indeterminate form? 37. Aristoteles 
